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Choice Programs and Market-Based
Separationism
PAUL E. SALAMANCAt
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris' appears to clear the way for a wide
variety of educational and charitable choice plans. In this
decision, the Court upheld against Establishment Cause
Challenge a formally neutral school choice program that
encompassed a wide variety of options in the public and
private sector, including private sectarian schools. The
Court reasoned that, when the government makes aid
available to a broad class of recipients without regard to
their religious or non-religious affiliation, and when the
recipients have a genuine choice as to whether to obtain
that aid from a religious or non-religious provider, the Es-
tablishment Clause is not offended.2
If taken to its logical limits, the rule of law announced
in Zelman appears competent to sustain any of a number of
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
Copyright © 2002 by Paul E. Salamanca. I am indebted to a number of
individuals who helped me in putting this paper together, including Richard
Ausness, Tom Farrell, Michael Healy, Dayna Matthew, Frank Ravitch, John
Rogers, and Jerry Sumney. I am also indebted to the participants in the 2001
Annual Meeting of the Central States Law School Association, as well as to the
participants in the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of
American Law Schools, for their helpful suggestions. This paper is based in part
on an address given at the Lexington Theological Seminary in Lexington,
Kentucky, as part of its Convocation Series.
1. 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
2. See id. at 2467:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion,
and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in
turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of
their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
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public programs in which the government joins with private
organizations, both secular and non-secular, to provide
secular services. For example, in accordance with Zelman,
the government might be able to make available to needy
recipients vouchers for "substance abuse group therapy,"
which could be directed toward both public and private
programs, including such religiously based programs as
Alcoholics Anonymous. To say that such programs would
continue to implicate the Establishment Clause would be to
understate the case, but Zelman appears to impose a bur-
den upon persons challenging such programs that they
have not historically been called upon to bear.3
Arguably, this is all for the good, because several of the
animating purposes behind the Speech, Press, and Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment support the constitution-
ality of educational and charitable choice plans.4 Most
importantly, such plans facilitate a plurality of approaches
to thinking, learning, and individual maturation. Whereas
some parents might want their children to study secular
subjects in school and theological subjects elsewhere, others
might want their children to study these subjects together.5
Similarly, whereas some might want to address their em-
otional illness or substance abuse in a strictly non-sectarian
environment, others might prefer an environment that
3. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-
Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J. L. &
POLITICS (forthcoming Summer/Fall 2002). The authors' elucidation of the
issues regarding what I have described as a voucher program for "substance
abuse group therapy" is particularly insightful.
4. For purposes of this paper, I am defining an "educational choice plan" as
a plan pursuant to which the government directs money to private schools,
without reference to their sectarian or non-sectarian nature, on a per-student
basis to defray the cost of such students' tuition, strictly in accordance with a
decision by that child's parents that he or she should attend that school. The
details of any such plan could vary considerably, but, provided enrollment in
any particular school is voluntary, most variation among plans would be
immaterial to this paper. My definition of a charitable choice plan is similar,
but obviously would relate to social services other than education.
5. See generally Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106
HARv. L. REV. 581 (1993). Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (requiring a public university to pay certain
expenses of an explicitly Christian evangelical newspaper as part of a general
program supporting publications by students) ("It is, in a sense, something of an
understatement to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a
viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought.").
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relies upon overtly sectarian or broadly deistic principles.6
If the Speech, Press, and Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment are designed to facilitate study, reflection,
individual development, and the interchange of ideas,7 then
encouraging a plurality of approaches to such activities
promotes values that underlie the amendment.
Moreover, educational choice plans can also be used to
implement goals underlying the Equal Protection Clause,
including the goal of promoting greater harmony among the
various peoples who inhabit the United States.8 Research
indicates that true harmony among people of different
faiths can come about effectively at the theological level, at
which people of sometimes rival faiths manage to bridge
gaps between their own traditions and those of others.9 If
this bridge-building can occur at the theological level, it
follows that theological study should be encouraged, not
marginalized."
6. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS 59 (3d ed. 1976) (setting forth the steps of the A.A. program) (Step
Two: "Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to
sanity.").
7. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 254 (1989)
(discussing self-actualization in the context of reporters' constitutional rights);
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615, 1640 (1987) (describing free speech as
"part of a web of mutually reinforcing values," including "self-realization").
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 304 (1990).
Judge Posner finds the "ultimate justification" for Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
not in technical legal materials but in such political and ethical
desiderata as improving the position of blacks; adopting a principle of
racial (and implicitly also religious and ethnic) equality to vindicate the
ideals for which World War II had recently been fought; raising public
consciousness about racial injustice; promoting social peace through
racial harmony; [and] breathing new life into the equal protection
clause.
Id.
9. See LEROND CURRY, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA: WORLD
WAR I THROUGH VATICAN II 66, 79 (1972).
10. Some may argue that certain religions are naturally inward looking, or
so disposed to an aggressive form of conversion, that facilitating instruction in
such religions would only exacerbate gaps between religious groups. To the
extent this is true, the Fourteenth Amendment's broad purpose of encouraging
harmony between groups of people would not be promoted immediately. On the
other hand, religious traditions in the United States often become American-
ized, no matter how isolationist they may originally be. See generally RODNEY
STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF RELIGION
(2000) (noting that growth tends to result in the lowering of a religious group's
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The foregoing considerations lend affirmative support
to the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman. But, in order to
prevail, these considerations must overcome highly re-
garded principles that tilt in the opposite direction. Specifi-
cally, these considerations must engage the tradition of
strict separationism and "no aid" to pervasively sectarian
institutions, which dominated the Court during much of the
period following the Second World War and which still
enjoys strong support from the four justices who dissented
vociferously from the Court's decision in Zelman." But this
is not an impossible task. In fact, the time seems propitious
for a continued, substantial realignment of the Court's basic
approach to non-establishment.
The five justices who formed the majority in Zelman
appear to be committed to a form of separationism that I
would like to call "market-based separationism." Taking its
cue from classic liberal economics, this form of separation-
ism presumes that the government can subsidize some or
all consumers in a market, without violating the Establish-
ment Clause, if the supply in the market is sufficiently
large and variegated to make choice the operative principle
in uniting consumers with producers, if the subsidy is for-
mally neutral with regard to religious and non-religious
options, and if the product at issue can be defined in strictly
secular terms.
This approach to non-establishment has several ad-
vantages. First, it accurately reflects the economic theory to
which most Americans subscribe. Second, it does not over-
estimate the impact of official policy on religious choices,
which are in actuality driven by a wide variety of factors
some of which are impervious to governmental influence. 1
tension with society and thereby leads to a decline in the average level of
member commitment). Moreover, even an isolationist religion in an otherwise
pluralist society tends to have an impact on others in that society, if only
because other religions must respond to its attraction.
11. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from the
Court's decision in Zelman. At one point in his dissent, Justice Souter described
the majority's opinion as having reached "doctrinal bankruptcy." Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 U.S. 2460, 2486 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also
id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing two of the majority's criteria for a
program that satisfies the Establishment Clause as "nothing but examples of
verbal formalism"). Similarly, Justice Breyer described the majority's opinion in
Zelman as "turn [ing] the clock back." Id. at 2508 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Religious behavior can be analyzed like other economic phenomena. See
generally STARK & FINKE, supra note 10, at 86 ("When people change churches
934 [Vol. 50
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Third, it eschews a radically substantive or empirical
approach to non-establishment, thus enabling public
officials to formulate policy with a relatively clear idea of
what the Constitution permits and forbids. Finally, because
it retains some substantive components, market-based
separationism may appeal in the long run to those who
resist formally neutral interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Because it requires a certain minimum breadth and
variegation in the class of providers, and because it
presumably limits public subsidies to strictly secular
products and services, this form of separationism arguably
coheres with the traditional separationist notion that the
Clause requires close assessment of the actual impact of
governmental programs on religious choices.13
It is my thesis that the Court should continue to move
cautiously in this direction. Notwithstanding a slight re-
storation of faith in government arising from the "war on
terrorism," the idea of looking beyond the public sector in
the provision of public goods continues to attract the atten-
tion of.policy-makers. Formerly public industries have been
privatized in many countries, and the process of privatiza-
or even religions, it is usually not because their preferences have changed, but
because the new church or faith more effectively appeals to preferences they
have always had."); id. at 113 ("[Pleople go about being religious in much the
same way that they go about everything else... [11n their dealings with the
gods, people bargain, shop around, procrastinate, weigh costs and benefits, skip
installment payments, and even cheat."); id. at 122 ("[Clonverts very seldom are
religious seekers, and conversion is seldom the culmination of a conscious
search-most converts do not so much as find a new faith as the new faith finds
them."); id. at 199 ("[R]eligious economies can never be fully monopolized, even
when backed by the full coercive powers of the state. Indeed, even at the height
of its temporal power, the medieval church was surrounded by heresy and
dissent.").
13. In this regard, candor compels the observation that, among the justices
who dissented in Zelman, this may appeal only to Justice Breyer, who joined
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836
(2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Breyer, J.). Justice
Breyer has demonstrated some fondness for liberal economic theory. See
generally Edward A. Fallone, The Clinton Court is Open for Business: The
Business Law Jurisprudence of Justice Stephen Breyer, 59 Mo. L. REV. 857, 866
(1994) ("Justice Breyer approaches regulatory questions with a general bias
towards the free market and against regulation."). A choice program is a form of
deregulation, in that it expands the category of providers beyond the public
sector, although in so doing it may encompass both religious and non-religious
providers. If Justice Breyer can be persuaded to see the market-based and
deregulatory aspects of a choice program more readily than the unintended
religious aspects, then he may be persuaded to uphold such a program.
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tion continues.14 Public activities are often managed by
private concerns. 5 Governmental domination of the health-
care industry was decisively rejected in the political arena
during President Clinton's first term. 16 Home-schooling has
become increasingly common. 7 Serious proposals have been
made to privatize at least a portion of the retirement
aspects of social security, although they may not be faring
well in the post-Enron environment. r Thus, there is a
general trend, supported by a broad spectrum of the public,
to outsource governmental operations. 9 Choice plans fit
14. See DAVID OSBORNE & PETER PLASTRIK, THE REINVENTOR'S FIELDBOOK:
TOOLS FOR TRANSFORMING YOUR GOVERNMENT 93 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Robert W. Poole, Jr., Transport at the Millennium:
Privatization: A New Transportation Paradigm, 53 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 94 (1997) (discussing various means by which governments and the
private sector share responsibility for managing highways and airports). Mr.
Poole has noted that:
In the United States, contracting out, or outsourcing, is the most
common mode of privatization. A large variety of public facilities are
being operated by private firms under relatively short-term contracts
(typically with a duration of five years or less). Among these are
airports, convention centers, data-processing centers, golf courses, jails,
sports arenas, toll collection systems, and water and wastewater plants
or systems.
Id. at 96.
16. See DAVID GERGEN, EYEWITNESS TO POWER: THE ESSENCE OF LEADERSHIP:
NIXON TO CLINTON 304 (2000) (commenting on the failure of President Clinton's
health-care proposal) ("To propose a health care plan that smacked of
governmental control ran directly counter to our core national beliefs in
individualism and laissez-faire."); id. at 300 (describing the initial plan as
"immensely complex and requir[ing] far more governmental intrusion into
health care than I thought appropriate or politically viable."); DICK MORRIS,
BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE: GETTING REELECTED AGAINST ALL ODDS 111 (1999)
(noting that First Lady Hillary Clinton "became fascinated with the idea of a
complete reworking of the health-care system and fashioned a white elephant
that wouldn't sell and undermined the president's credibility").
17. See Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational
Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2000) (noting
the increased demand for legislation that will permit parents to home-school
their children).
18. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Privatization Process: Redistribution Under a
Partially Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 971 (1998)
(footnote omitted) ("Once viewed as a radical recommendation, proposals to
privatize Social Security abound. Moreover, proposals to privatize partially
Social Security are beginning to receive serious consideration.").
19. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & PETER PLASTRIK, BANISHING
BUREAUCRACY: THE FIVE STRATEGIES FOR REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1997)
[hereinafter OSBORNE & PLASTRIK, BANISHING BUREAUCRACY]. In fact, not only
are public services often provided by private concerns, but even the distinction
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squarely into this trend, and the Zelman majority's ap-
proach to separationism may play an instrumental role in
this process.
Needless to say, however, the Establishment Clause is
not a plebiscite. In fact, traditional separationists are likely
to argue that one of the purposes of the clause is to prevent
majoritarian preferences from skewing the religious debate.
But the majoritarian sentiment that would support market-
based separationism derives not from a desire to impose
religious views on dissenting minorities, nor from a desire
to promote religious views on the whole, but instead from a
desire to facilitate a broad variety of approaches to im-
portant social projects and intractable social ills. Moreover,
market-based separationists can point out, quite accurately,
that the Establishment Clause has been a matter of policy
since the inception of the separationist era.2° In light of this,
they can argue that they are merely proposing a better
policy to inform the non-establishment principle than tradi-
tional separationism. In addition, they can point to other
policy-based aspects of the First Amendment that support
decentralization of responsibility and private choice. On
this view, choice plans promote values underlying the First
Amendment because they facilitate a variety of cognitive
and emotional approaches to such important social ac-
between public and private authority in many contexts is no longer what it once
was. Cf Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental
Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45,
46 (1995) (discussing non-governmental organizations in the international
arena):
It is almost as if the world has arrived at a sort of neomedievalism in
which the institutions and sources of authority are multifarious. Just
as the leader of the Knights Templars or of the Franciscan order
outranked all but the most powerful princes, so too the secretary
general of Amnesty International and the chief executive officer of
Royal Dutch Shell cast far longer shadows than do the leaders of
Moldova, Namibia, or Nauru. The state may not be quite ready to
wither away, but it's not what it used to be.
20. See Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State
Relations, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 121 (2001) (reasoning that "cultural
currents" affect the Court's rulings on the Establishment Clause):
[Als Justice White once wrote, the courts, left with discretion by the
broad words and ambiguous history of the Religion Clause, have used
it to "carve out what they deemed to be the most desirable national
policy governing various aspects of church-state relationships."
Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
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tivities as education, charity, and reformation of the emo-
tionally ill and the substance dependent.
Before one can engage traditional separationism on the
level of policy, however, one must engage its safe harbors.
These include its claim to originalism and its claim to be
the well-settled judgment of the polity.2 Accordingly, this
article has several parts. In Parts I and II, I will examine
the predicate for traditional separationism-its claim to rest
upon original intent, its implicit claim to be free of anti-
pathetic origins, and its claim to be founded in a coherent,
vital line of precedent. In this regard, I conclude that tradi-
tional separationism rests upon several vulnerable supposi-
tions. First, any claim that strict separationism can lay to a
foundation in original intent is modest at best.22 Second,
circumstantial evidence suggests that traditional sepa-
rationism arose from antipathy toward a particular relig-
ious tradition, Roman Catholicism. To the extent this
evidence is accurate the bona fides of this form of separa-
tionism are suspect." Third, even if traditional separation-
ism did not arise from antipathy toward Roman Catholi-
cism, the historical record amply demonstrates that ap-
prehension of that religious tradition's growing strength,
antipathetic or not, underlay some of the Court's most im-
portant decisions implementing the Establishment Clause
in the modern era. Because this apprehension, even if
rational at one time, is no longer well-founded, its role in
traditional separationism is properly subject to reevalu-
ation. 4 Fourth, traditional separationism has lost much of
its creativity and vitality in the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence, having been eclipsed by a growing, vital jurispruden-
tial interest in treating all claimants to the government's
largesse equally, without reference to religious orientation.
Given this trend, unwavering adherence to this form of
separationism may no longer be justified.25 Finally, in Part
III, I will explore from a constitutional and from a policy
perspective some of the advantages that choice programs
present.
21. This is not simply an argument about stare decisis. See infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
22. See infra Part I, notes 30-73 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II-A, notes 78-110 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part II-B, notes 111-57 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II-C, notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
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In fact, it would not take much doctrinal movement in
traditional separationism to accommodate a choice program
and to sustain the rough contours of Zelman. Aside from a
rule against direct financial aid to religiously affiliated
entities that itself is problematic,26 traditional separation-
ism amounts to an honest yet ultimately subjective assess-
ment of the "primary effects" of governmental programs,"
with doubts historically resolved against the provision of
public aid, at least in the context of primary and secondary
education.28 By the simple expedient of redefining what
constitutes a "primary effect"-such as by focusing on the
secular impact of public programs rather than their un-
intended impact on religion, the egalitarian nature of the
criteria by which a program is administered, or the role of
private choice in the selection of service provider-trad-
itional sejarationism could accommodate many choice
programs.
I. STRICT SEPARATIONISM'S WEAK CLAIM TO ORIGINALISM
As an interpretive maxim for the Establishment
Clause, traditional separationism dates not so much from
1791 as from the modern era.3" In fact, the relationship be-
tween this form of separationism in the late eighteenth
century and the impetus behind the clause was modest at
best. Modern understandings to the contrary are perhaps
26. Cf Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School
Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 375, 389-92 (1999)
[hereinafter Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case] (distinguishing the relig-
ious assessment opposed by James Madison in Virginia in the late eighteenth
century from the kinds of school voucher programs proposed today); Douglas
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43,
49 (1997) [hereinafter Laycock, Underlying Unity].
27. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
28. See John H. Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 S. CT.
REV. 61, 86; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 288-89 (2001) ("[T]he blurred
margins of the no-aid policy should not disguise its effect. Everson drew the line
between permissible support for education and impermissible aid to religion
very far to one side.").
29. Indeed, as one scholar has argued, the idea of "strict" or "no-aid"
separationism-which I refer to as "traditional separationism"-has never
commanded a majority of the Court, except in the context of aid to primary and
secondary schools, and has never fully prevailed even in this context. See
Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 26, at 54-55.
30. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 281.
2002] 939
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best explained by George Orwell's insight that "those who
control the present control the past"31-an insight that is not
so much an indictment of human nature as a statement of
fact. Orwell's insight was demonstrated literally in Justice
Black's opinion for the Court in Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing,32 the seminal case for modern strict
separationism. In this opinion, Justice Black wrote a tract
on religious establishment and disestablishment in the
United States that suffered from a fair degree of ahistori-
cism.33 His argument essentially ran as follows: First, he
described in general terms the "turmoil, civil strife, and
persecutions" that characterized the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation in Europe.34 He then observed that
the "practices of the old world were transplanted to and
began to thrive in the soil of the new America," 5 noting that
"It]hese practices became so commonplace as to shock the
freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence."36
After this, he described at length the movement to dis-
establish the Anglican Church in Virginia in the late eight-
eenth century, a movement in which Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison played major roles, and which culminated
in Virginia's now-famous "Bill for Religious Liberty.""
Finally, he equated the impetus behind Virginia's disestab-
lishment with the impetus behind the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment:
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the
First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison
and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective
and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
statute.38
31. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 251 (1949). For an observation on American
historiographic focus on the Virginia experience, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 75 (2d ed. rev.
1994).
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
33. See L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 24-27 (1995).
34. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 11-13.
38. Id. at 13. Justice Black's claim in Everson that the Court had previously
940 [Vol. 50
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Opinions since Everson have built upon Justice Black's
narrative, 9 and Justice Souter, one of the leading separa-
tionists on the current Court, continues to cite to this
passage in Everson."
Justice Black's history is not entirely accurate, and no
amount of compounding his inaccuracy can rectify the error.
James Madison may well have been shocked into a feeling
of abhorrence by establishmentarian practices,41 and per-
haps all fair-minded people in the founding era opposed
religious persecution of the kind that vexed Madison. But
the record reveals that many colonials preferred a religious
establishment, and this included John Adams, the second
President of the United States, who helped launch the
Massachusetts religious establishment of 1780."2 Nowhere
connected Virginia's disestablishment to the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment was literally accurate, up to a point, but only because he combined
the two Religion Clauses. Of the three cases he cited in support of this claim,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679 (1871), and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), only Reynolds
included an explicit discussion of the Virginia experience, and that case
involved a federal practice challenged under the Free Exercise Clause. See
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162-63. Neither Davis nor Watson included a discussion of
the Virginia experience in the opinion of the Court. In any case, these decisions
have no more claim to originalism than Everson itself.
39. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 770 n. 28 (1973); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963).
The Court wrote in Schempp that "[Tihe views of Madison and Jefferson,
preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal
Constitution but likewise in most of our States." 374 U.S. at 214 (footnote
omitted).
40. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 & n.1 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Madison's] authority on questions
about the meaning of the Establishment Clause is well settled."). It is entirely
possible, of course, that Justice Souter means only to say that the Everson
Court's equation of the Virginia experience with the Establishment Clause is
entitled to the protection of stare decisis, not that it is historically accurate. If
so, his assertion is well taken and the equation must be addressed on those
terms, as a new interpretive maxim for the clause. It still remains true, how-
ever, that the equation cannot readily be grounded in originalism, as a matter
of historical fact.
41. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 & n.9.
42. See John Witte, Jr., "A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of
Religion": John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST.
213, 214, 216-19 (1999). See also Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Relig-
ion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1120 (1998) [hereinafter Lash, Power and Subject]
(emphasis in original) ("Notwithstanding the separationist views of men like
Madison and Jefferson, many people throughout [the founding] period
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in his analysis in Everson did Justice Black acknowledge
the existence of state-level establishments after 1791.
Notwithstanding frequently expressed beliefs to the
contrary,4 the connection between Virginia's experience
and the Establishment Clause is quite attenuated.44 Con-
siderable scholarship indicates that the original intent
behind the Establishment Clause was not nearly as sub-
stantive, in an anti-establishmentarian sense, as the intent
that underlay Virginia's disestablishment. In fact, this
scholarship indicates that the original thinking behind the
clause was considerably more federalist than anti-
establishmentarian, and not much more ambitious than the
words of the clause suggest.45
In 1789, when Congress was debating the text of what
became the Establishment Clause, six states retained
religious establishments of one form or another.46 Mas-
sachusetts, most notably, retained an increasingly complex
religious establishment that at first was predominantly
Trinitarian Congregationalist, but that became more radi-
cally non-preferential over time, until it was finally
disbanded in 1833. 47 Meanwhile Virginia, in sharp contrast
to such establishmentarian states as Massachusetts, sus-
pended mandatory tithes in favor of the Anglican Church in
continued to believe that government regulation of religion in the states was an
indispensable aspect of responsible government.").
43. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School
Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37, 44 (1993) ("James Madison proposed the federal
First Amendment in large part as a result of his experience in Virginia battling
Patrick Henry's Bill for Religious Assessments.").
44. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 285-86 ("The Everson Court not
only ascribed to the Establishment Clause separationist content; it imagined a
past to confirm that interpretation. Both the majority and the dissent treated
the history of the United States as if it were the history of Virginia.").
45. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress,
Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539,
1556-60 (1995) (collecting articles).
46. See JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 77 (2000); LEVY, supra note 31,
at 75.
47. See Witte, supra note 42 (describing the adoption of the Massachusetts
establishment in the late eighteenth century); LEVY, supra note 31, at 29-42
(describing the Massachusetts establishment from its genesis in 1780 until its
abandonment in 1833). See also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN
GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 218-44 (2001) (collecting cases
and other primary source material).
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1776, 1777, and 1778,48 and in 1785 enacted its famous "Bill
for Establishing Religious Liberty," permanently precluding
a religious establishment within its borders." Thus, the
landscape at the time the nation ratified the Establishment
Clause was highly variegated. Some states had affirma-
tively and deliberately chosen to retain an established faith
in the face of stiff opposition and contrary choices being
made elsewhere," whereas at least one other state had cho-
sen to disestablish religion with a comparable degree of en-
gagement and deliberation.5
Given this landscape, it is unlikely that the proponents
of the Establishment Clause sought to accomplish much, if
anything, beyond keeping Congress out of the fray.52 This
simple goal was achieved with the spare language of the
clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion." This left the states free to establish
religion, if they so desired, or to disestablish it. Moreover, it
left the federal courts free to exercise subject matter juris-
diction and to provide remedies in cases where the parties
were diverse and the case called for the enforcement of an
obligation to tithe.5
48. See LEVY, supra note 31, at 60-61.
49. See id. at 68.
50. See Witte, supra note 42, at 227-32 (describing the prolonged debate
over Article III of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the most contro-
versial component of the state's religious establishment).
51. See LEVY, supra note 31, at 67 (describing Virginia's debate on
establishment as "intensive and prolonged.").
52. See Bybee, supra note 45, at 1560 (footnote omitted) (noting that the
final change in the language of the clause, substituting "respecting an
establishment of religion" for "establishing religion," "ensured that Congress
could not dis-establish religion any more than it could establish it; it placed the
matter beyond Congress's competence."); LEVY, supra note 31, at 95 ("Perhaps
the word 'national' [in Madison's proposed language for the Establishment
Clause, 'nor shall any national religion be established'] was superfluous, but
Madison aimed at allaying apprehensions on the part of those states that main-
tained their own establishments of religion."). Cf. Joseph M. Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 373
(arguing that the First Amendment imposes a "political" limitation on the fed-
eral government, rather than conferring upon individuals a constitutional
right").
53. See LEVY, supra note 31, at 97-98 (reprinting the record of the debate in
the House on the Establishment Clause) (statement of Benjamin Huntington).
See also Bybee, supra note 45, at 1560-62. Of course, it is hard to imagine a
church seeking to enforce a tithe and the delinquent congregant being of diverse
citizenship.
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Because the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause was essentially federalist, when the Supreme Court
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to make the clause applicable to the states in
Everson, the clause was not so much extended as renovated.
It was no longer a rule that simply eliminated one category
of decision-making from the federal government, a govern-
ment of already limited powers; it was now a substantive
limitation on the states, governments of general powers.
Such a transformation requires its own "original" intent
and cannot depend upon the original intent of a substan-
tially different constitutional provision.14 If the original in-
tent of the Establishment Clause in 1791 was primarily to
protect a particular state choice from federal interference,"
the thinking behind the incorporation in 1947 had to be
markedly different, for the clause as renovated now elimi-
nated the very choice that it was originally designed to
protect.56
There is at least one plausible non-federalist
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but it does not
fit as comfortably with the full historical record as the
federalist interpretation. Some have suggested that the
clause may have been intended to serve as a substantive
54. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principal, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085,
1135-37 (1995) (proposing a new originalism for the clause).
55. Cf Bybee, supra note 45, at 1560 (discussing the First Amendment as a
whole). Bybee writes:
The records we have [of the state ratifying conventions for the First
Amendment] suggest the First Amendment applied only to Congress,
and the general lack of interest confirms that the Founders had
successfully deferred the difficult questions of the content of freedom of
expression to other fora, the states.
Id.
56. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 294-95 ("If the original
Establishment Clause aimed to confirm the exclusive authority of the States
over religion, invoking that provision to disallow state aid to religion is
paradoxical and perverse."). This does not mean, of course, that modern
separationism is limited to the original intent behind the clause. Were that the
case, then incorporation of the clause into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would itself be suspect. Moreover, insistence upon a
strictly originalist-and largely federalist-interpretation of the Establishment
Clause would require similar interpretation of the remaining clauses of the
First Amendment, which I do not do elsewhere in the article. I am not making a
strictly originalist argument. I am simply arguing that traditional separation-
ism must be justified on modern, non-originalist terms. I am indebted to Ron
Krotoszynski for pointing out this distinction.
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limitation on establishmentarianism at the federal level,
maintaining that the authors of the provision wrote that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion," rather than "Congress shall establish no religion"
in an effort to prohibit even legislation that tended in such
a direction, however feebly.57 On this view, the authors of
the provision were not simply trying to protect state estab-
lishments, but instead sought to implement a broad form of
anti-establishmentarianism at the federal level. If this were
true, then importing Jefferson and Madison's sentiments in
support of the clause would follow with some plausibility.
The substantive interpretation of the clause finds some
support in the record and certainly can be defended as a
secondary concern. For example, it appears that certain
members of the House could not agree on what kinds of
legislation should fall within the proposed anti-establish-
mentarian provision. A path out of this dilemma arguably
lay in proscribing not only an establishment, but also a law
"respecting" such an establishment.58 But this interpreta-
tion does not present itself as the most plausible inference
from the record, because it fails to account for the dominant
strain in deliberations over the clause. Set forth in the
Appendix is a record of the debate in the House on the
proposed amendment to the Constitution that "no religion
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed."
Although several strands of argument were evident in
this debate, certain lines of coherence did emerge. First,
three members-Representatives Sylvester, Gerry, and
Huntington-did appear to speak to the substantive ques-
tion, that is, to what kinds of establishmentarian laws the
provision would proscribe. But the actual debate in this
regard was relatively thin. Representative Sylvester ap-
peared to fear that religion would fail without establish-
57. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("A law may be
one 'respecting' the forbidden objective while falling short of its total
realization."). See also WITTE, supra note 46, at 78-79 (describing this inter-
pretation as "a second plausible reading"); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
875, 881 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid] ("The establishment
clause actually adopted [was] one of the broadest versions considered by either
House. It [forbade] not only establishments, but also any law respecting or
relating to an establishment.").
58. See WITTE, supra note 46, at 78-79.
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ment. This was conventional wisdom among many New En-
glanders (although Sylvester himself was a New Yorker).5 9
Perhaps he was agitating here for a weaker rule, such as
one prohibiting preference for one sect over another. 60 Rep-
resentative Gerry then proposed, perhaps in response to
Sylvester's observation, that the language be changed to
read that "no religious doctrine shall be established by law."
Sylvester's and Gerry's remarks were brief, and they elic-
ited no response from the other members present. The
fairest inference from this lack of response was a dearth of
interest in the substantive scope of the clause.
After Gerry spoke, the debate moved on to a lengthy
discussion by Representatives Sherman, Carroll, and
Madison about whether the Constitution needed an anti-
establishmentarian clause at all. This discussion took up
roughly four times as much space in the records of the de-
bate as the remarks of Sylvester and Gerry, and concluded
with a gentle reminder from Madison, the Bill of Rights'
shepherd, that certain ratifying conventions in the states
had feared that Congress might use its powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to "establish a national relig-
ion."
Representative Huntington then spoke at length,
expressing one concern of an essentially federalist nature,
that the proposed language would apply so comprehensively
to the various branches of the federal government that an
obligation to tithe could not be enforced in federal court. He
also expressed a second, substantive concern, that latitu-
dinarian construction of the provision could lend support to
atheists. Again, Madison responded by bringing the debate
back to a strictly federalist posture, proposing that the word
"national" be inserted into the provision under considera-
tion, such that it read "no national religion shall be
established by law." He opined that, were this word insert-
59. See Marc M. Arkin, Regionalism and the Religion Clauses: The
Contribution of Fisher Ames, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 787 (1999).
60. It is also possible that Sylvester is articulating a simple, linguistic
objection to the proposal that no religion shall be established by law.
Specifically, his objection might be that this language appears to impose an
affirmative injunction upon government to "establish no religion"-that is, to
abolish it. Although this is an unlikely interpretation of the language, it is not
grammatically precluded.
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ed, "it would point the amendment directly to the object it
was intended to prevent."61
Representative Livermore then represented that he was
"not satisfied" with Madison's proposal, although he ap-
peared to want the House to move on to completely
different matters. He then proposed the language that the
House ultimately adopted, that "Congress shall make no
laws touching religion." Given Madison's immediately pre-
ceding comment, which was quite federalist in its focus, it is
entirely reasonable to assume that Livermore offered his
proposal in this vein as well. Of course, his comment had
the added benefit of addressing Huntington's essentially
federalist concern about the enforceability of tithes in
federal court.
Although the debate did reflect a lack of consensus as to
what would constitute a prohibited establishment, it did not
indicate that this was a concern to more than a few people.
The small amount of attention paid to substantive issues, in
comparison to the significant attention paid to federalist
issues, strongly supports the federalist interpretation of the
clause."
It is difficult to glean much information about the
genesis of the Establishment Clause after the measure left
the House, because the Senate did not keep records its
debate.63 But we do know that the Senate adopted varying
61. Professor Laycock has argued that it is "hard to know what Madison was
thinking" when he made his remarks on the floor of the House, contending that
Madison's "two statements are inconsistent with all his previous and sub-
sequent statements concerning establishment." Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid,
supra note 57, at 893. Madison's statements are cryptic if one looks to them for
guidance as to whether Madison wanted the Establishment Clause to ban all
support for religion, or simply preferential support for one religion, but they are
not cryptic if one simply looks to them for guidance as to whether the clause
was intended to accomplish a federalist or substantive objective. With regard to
that subject, they are arguably quite clear.
62. Professor Laycock has also argued that the similarity of substantive
remarks such as those of Gerry to arguments made in state controversies
suggests a substantive intent behind the Establishment Clause, as I have used
that term. See id. at 908. Professor Laycock's argument appears to be that such
individuals as Gerry simply restated in the House ongoing substantive concerns
from state establishmentarian debates. But analysis of the entire debate in the
House tends to support the opposite conclusion. Granted that Gerry and others
(Sylvester, Huntington) sought to limit the overall substantive significance of
the clause, their remarks had no discernible impact on the course of the debate
and were subsumed in the larger federalist discussion.
63. See id. at 883.
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versions of the clause, some of which would have proscribed
only preference for one religion over another, and others of
which were written more broadly.64 Although one can infer
from the Senate's adoption of these various proposals a
familiarity with the difference between broad disestablish-
ment and simple "non-preferentialism,"65 the Senate's flip-
flopping is also fair evidence of a lack of consensus on
substantive issues, or perhaps a sense that the substantive
differences between the drafts, although important to us,
struck them as being of minor importance once the
federalist issue was resolved. All of the versions adopted by
the Senate built upon the House's resolution of the
federalist issue by limiting the clause's application to
Congress.
In addition, the substantive interpretation of the clause
assumes that Congress could not have enacted a law "re-
specting an establishment of religion" that applied solely to
the District of Columbia or to the territories. Although this
is-by widely shared consensus-the interpretation given to
the clause today, the forbidden status of such a law under
the original intent of the clause is not self-evident. If Con-
gress was expected to respect states' prerogatives regarding
religious establishments, it would not necessarily follow
that it was expected to refrain from exercising similar pre-
rogatives in places over which it enjoyed the police power,
such as the District and the territories. In fact, the opposite
might have been the case,66 and Congress seems to have act-
ed on the assumption that it could exercise such
64. See id. at 879-81 (noting that the Senate adopted in turn the following
three anti-establishmentarian provisions: (1) "Congress shall make no law
establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others"; (2) "Congress
shall make no law establishing religion"; and (3) "Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship").
65. See id. at 880 (arguing that the various drafts considered by the Senate
"show that if the First Congress intended to forbid only preferential establish-
ments, its failure to do so explicitly was not for want of acceptable wording").
66. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the
Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 674, 713 (1987); Lash, Power and Subject, supra note 42, at
1120 (footnote omitted) ("[W]hen Congress authorized territorial laws
prohibiting blasphemy and mandating observance of the Sabbath, it acted as a
proto-state government, presumably preparing the territory-and the
population therein-for admission to the Union, at which time such laws would
continue to be enforced.").
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prerogatives in such places, 7  passing legislation to
incorporate an Episcopal Church in the District, 8 and pro-
viding for the support of religion in the Northwest Territo-
ries, both before and after the Establishment Clause
became part of the Constitution. 9 Although Madison vetoed
the District bill,7 ° it is not unreasonable to attribute this
choice at least in part to his own separationist ideas.
Virginia had long forbidden the incorporation of religious
bodies.7' Moreover, there is no evidence that Madison
opposed the Northwest Ordinance. 2
The foregoing analysis indicates that casual equation of
the intent behind the Establishment Clause with the intent
behind Virginia's disestablishment is not justified. 3 Con-
sequently, traditional separationism cannot claim the
mantle of eighteenth-century originalist intent to the exclu-
sion of other, more accommodating approaches to the
separation of church and state.
II. TRADITIONAL SEPARATIONISM'S QUESTIONABLE MODERN
BASIS
Traditional separationism's other safe harbor is its
claim to represent the well-settled judgment of the polity.
This is more than just a reliance upon stare decisis, al-
though it is also that. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a
rule of law that is arguably "wrong" in a platonic sense is
67. See generally Bradley, supra note 66, at 713.
68. See Lash, Power and Subject, supra note 42, at 1121 n.182.
69. The Northwest Ordinance was enacted well before the First Amendment
was ratified. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50. This ordinance included the
following language: "[Rieligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of edu-
cation shall forever be encouraged." Id. at 52, n.(a). Other statutes came after
the First Amendment in time. See Lash, Power and Subject, supra note 42, at
1118.
70. See Lash, Power and Subject, supra note 42, at 1121 n.182.
71. See Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the
Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1529-33 (1973).
72. See WITTE, supra note 46, at 76 (noting that Congress reenacted the
Continental Congress' Northwest Ordinance "without issue").
73. In fact, it has been argued by at least one scholar that the Virginia
experience and Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty were retrieved from an
obscure position in the historical record in service of the separationist
movement in the United States in the mid-twentieth century. See John T.
McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual
Imagination, 1928-1960, J. Am. HiST., June 1997, at 97, 113.
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nevertheless entitled to some degree of protection simply
because continuity in judicial decisionmaking has independ-
ent value.74 But traditional separationism's claim to a safe
harbor in this regard goes beyond simply claiming that it is
correct enough to merit the protection of stare decisis. It
also claims that it is correct, and that it reflects the
considered judgment of the polity.
This claim is subject to challenge on several fronts.
First, examination of the historical record supports the
conclusion that antipathy toward Roman Catholicism in the
United States in the mid-twentieth century may have
exerted a subtle influence on the Court's early separationist
decisions. 5 Second, whatever rational fears may have in-
fluenced the Court at that time no longer have the
foundation that they once had, and therefore can no longer
be used to justify traditional separationism, at least absent
reassessment." Finally, the growth of formal neutrality in
the Court's approach to non-establishment has significantly
eclipsed traditional separationism, thereby undermining
much of its claim to the protection of stare decisis.77
A. Anti-Catholic Animus
A scholar is naturally hesitant to suggest invidious
motives on the part of people who dedicate their lives to
public service. Nevertheless, more than one responsible
scholar has gently chided the early and mid-separationist
Court for handing down decisions that reflect anti-catholic
animus."8 Although the evidence for this animus is essen-
74. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay
on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 573 (2001) (noting that
the doctrine of stare decisis "gives the Justices a Warrant (of some weight) to
affirm initially erroneous decisions that would be costly to overrule").
75. See infra Part II-A, notes 78-110 and accompanying text.
76. See infra Part II-B, notes 111-57 and accompanying text.
77. See infra Part II-C, notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 280 ("The constitutional
disfavor of 'pervasively sectarian' institutions is indeed a doctrine born, if not of
bigotry, at least of a highly partisan understanding of laws 'respecting an
establishment of religion."'); Berg, supra note 20, at 123 ("[T]he late 1940s and
the early 1950s saw a resurgence in fear and distrust of Catholicism, and these
contributed to the rise of church-state separationism in constitutional decisions,
especially in decisions limiting aid to religious, overwhelmingly Catholic,
schools."); Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case, supra note 26, at 385-86
(describing Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of
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tially circumstantial, it is not minuscule. To the extent this
evidence is persuasive, it weakens traditional separation-
ism's claim to be the well-settled judgment of the polity.
By the mid-1940s, fear of Roman Catholicism had
become common among the intellectual elite of the United
States. It was neither a passing fancy, nor a minor subject.
Even today, this apprehension is easy to substantiate
because of its breadth and because it showed few signs of
internal ambivalence, in contrast to such apprehension in
earlier periods of American history, when it was mixed with
a general mistrust of unassimilated immigrant popula-
tions. 9 One particularly comprehensive treatment of the
subject is a recent article by John T. McGreevy published in
the Journal of American History." In this article, McGreevy
meticulously described the extent and fervor of intellectual
attitudes toward Catholicism in the United States during
this period.
As one can readily imagine, these attitudes had
complex sources. They ranged from continuing theological
opposition to Roman Catholicism on a wide array of sub-
jects-most particularly, with regard to its authoritarianism
and attachment to naturalistic philosophy8 1-to fear and
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18-28 (1947) and Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-25 (1971), as "inquiries into the
sociology of a particular faith, and arguably prejudiced ones at that, mas-
querading as an inquiry into the meaning of the Constitution"). Cf Laycock,
Underlying Unity, supra note 26, at 50 (discussing nineteenth-century
Protestant-Catholic relations) ("Although there were legitimate arguments to be
made on both sides, the nineteenth-century opposition to funding religious
schools drew heavily on anti-Catholicism.").
79. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 102-04. See also Laycock, Underlying
Unity, supra note 26, at 57.
80. McGreevy, supra note 73. McGreevy's central argument is that
discussion of Catholicism, along with criticism of racial segregation and op-
position to fascism and Communism, helped define the terms of mid-twentieth-
century American liberalism. Those terms included the insistence that religion,
as an entirely private matter, must be separated from that of the state, that
religious loyalties must not threaten national unity, and that only an emphasis
on individual autonomy, thinking on one's own, would sustain American demo-
cracy. See id. at 98.
81. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 100 (describing the importance of "the
experimental spirit" to American intellectuals' "self-identity" in the mid-
twentieth century) ("In all areas of inquiry, the false security of a priori
assertions would be traded for hypothesis testing."). McGreevy goes on to note
that, with the exception of certain neo-Aristotelians:
Catholic intellectuals provided the most sustained opposition to such
notions. That opposition stemmed from Leo XIII's 1879 insistence that
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unrelieved anger at the Church's perceived role in
supporting fascism at home and abroad.2 This fear was no
doubt potentiated by the fact that Protestantism was losing
its status as the defining religion of the United States, and
that Catholicism had becomethe single largest denomina-
tion in the country.83 In some cases, this fear even included
association of Catholicism with Communism." At a more
topical level, these attitudes were precipitated by such
events as President Roosevelt's designation of Myron C.
Taylor as his "personal representative" to the Vatican in
1939,"5 and President Truman's later appointment of Gen-
eral Mark W. Clark to serve as ambassador to the Vatican
in 1951.86
These attitudes were reflected in, and enhanced by,
various articles and books published in the scholarly and
mainstream presses. One example is a series of articles that
began running in late 1944 in the mainline Protestant
periodical Christian Century under the general title of "Can
Catholicism Win America?" The author was Harold E. Fey,
one of the Century's editors.87 Another, more famous ex-
ample is a series of articles by Paul Blanshard, a former
Congregationalist minister, that ran in the Nation in 1947,
on the threat that Catholicism posed to the American way
of life.88 These articles were collected into a best-selling book
entitled American Freedom and Catholic Power. This book,
Catholic theology work from strict natural law premises, part of a
revival of Thomas Aquinas's scholastic philosophy that had immense
importance for European and American Catholic intellectual life.
Id. at 101.
82. See id. at 108-11; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 302 (footnote
omitted) ("American Protestants saw their faith as allied with republicanism
and feared Catholicism as inimical to democracy.")
83. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 305-06.
84. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 118.
85. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 37-40. See also CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN,
PATRIOTISM AND FRATERNALISM IN THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS: A HISTORY OF THE
FOURTH DEGREE 114 (2001).
86. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 47-49. See also Mark A. Noll, The Eclipse of
Old Hostilities between and the Potential for New Strife among Catholics and
Protestants Since Vatican II, in UNCIVIL RELIGION: INTERRELIGIOUS HOSTILITY IN
AMERICA 86 (Robert N. Bellah & Frederick E. Greenspahn eds., 1987);
KAUFFMAN, supra note 85, at 114.
87. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 42-44. See also KAUFFMAN, supra note 85, at
115-17.
88. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 57-59. See also KAUFFMAN, supra note 85, at
119-20.
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which was also a Book-of-the-Month-Club selection,' 9 re-
ceived favorable reviews from a wide range of influential
people, including the philosopher and educator John Dewey
and the noted scholar Lewis Mumford.9 ° Blanshard's book
also attracted close attention from Justice Black, author of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Everson.91
Much of Blanshard's book was a free-wheeling broad-
side against Catholicism in the United States, combining
strong words of disapproval with respect to theoretical
matters with express consgpiracy theories and gratuitous
pokes at Church traditions. For purposes of this paper, his
most important theme was that, although the Catholic laity
living in the United States were doing their level best to
assimilate, they were being controlled and oriented in an-
other direction by the clergy of the Church, which itself was
tied hierarchically to Rome.93 Catholics, he urged, were not
89. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 97.
90. See id. at 97-98.
91. See id. at 124 (noting that Justice Black "painstakingly" marked his
copy of Blanshard's book). See also id. (quoting HUGO T. BLACK, MY FATHER: A
REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975)) ("[Justice Black] suspected the Catholic Church. He
used to read all of Paul Blanshard's books exposing power abuse in the Catholic
Church.").
92. On Catholic religious orders for women, see PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN
FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 67 (1949) ("[Teaching nuns] belong to an age
when women allegedly enjoyed subjection and reveled in self-abasement. Their
unhygienic costumes and their medieval rules of conduct establish a barrier
between themselves and the outside world. . . ."). On science and Catholicism,
see id. at 224 ("[In practice . . .the 'honest' Catholic scientist disregards the
whole relics industry, and keeps his mouth shut. He concentrates, if possible, on
those subjects furthest removed from priestly exploitation. Catholic scientists
are famous for their investigations of the weather and earthquakes."). On
Catholic tradition and its deployment to serve ulterior motives:
The Roman Church in America has a great gift for showmanship, and
its ceremonials and costumes lend themselves naturally to pageantry
in the grand manner. Ten thousand Quakers can live in an American
community all their lives and not attract half the attention that ten
thousand Catholics do, especially if the Catholics have an energetic
bishop who understands modem publicity methods.
Id. at 11.
For an example of a gratuitous slap, see id. at 14 (noting that "[tihe Committees
of the [Catholic Church's] International Eucharistic Congress included even a
Committee on Bells and Whistles").
93. See id. at 5; id. at 10 (emphasis in original) ("The American Catholic
people have done their best to join the rest of America, but the American
Catholic hierarchy ... has never been assimilated. It is still fundamentally
Roman in its spirit and directives. It is an autocratic moral monarchy in a
liberal democracy."). Indeed, "[tihe whole Catholic system of global discipline
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permitted to think for themselves, and this hybrid
sociological-doctrinal fact, combined with the growing
demographic of Catholicism in the United States, posed a
serious threat to the American political system.94
It is entirely reasonable to accept some, and perhaps
many, of Fey and Blanshard's denunciations as well-taken
-as offered in the spirit of constructive criticism, or reluc-
tant witness to a disturbing presence in American society.
But it is hard to imagine that all of their denunciations
were offered in this spirit, or that, given their variety and
intensity, they were not predicated at least in part upon
something more than mere rational opposition. Gratuitous
mocking, for example, with which Blanshard's work is rife,
is not consistent with a spirit of constructive criticism.
Fey and Blanshard wrote their philippics at the very
time that the Supreme Court was first applying the
Establishment Clause to the activities of government in
way likely to have broad impact. Although the clause had
come into play in two earlier cases involving the activities
of the federal government,95 even in the mid-twentieth
century those activities were still minor in relation to those
of the states, at least with respect to those areas of policy
most likely to implicate religion.96 The ubiquity of praise for
Blanshard's work undermines the argument that the jus-
tices attending to establishmentarian issues were unaware
of it.97 Moreover, scholarship has demonstrated that a few
members of the Court, including Justice Black, were
directly influenced by Blanshard, or espoused similar
rests fundamentally on its great army of priests. The parish priest is the contact
man between the hierarchy and the people, and the agent for Roman spiritual
and political goods." Id. at 34.
94. See id. at 4.
95. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (involving a religious school
for the education of Sioux children); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899)
(dealing with a hospital run by a religious order in Washington, D.C.).
96. The federal government did not play a significant role in the educational
system of the United States, for example, until Congress enacted the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
97. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 281:
We make no effort to probe the subjective motivations of individual
justices. Instead, we aim to reveal the correspondences between
constitutional doctrine and popular sentiment in the area of church-
state relations. Put crudely, this is an exercise in post hoc, ergo propter
hoc, which is famous as a fallacy because it is so often true.
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sentiments." One particularly famous expression of this
sentiment was Justice Jackson's dissent in Everson, in
which he described Catholic schools of being "parochial only
in name-they, in fact, represent a world-wide and age-old
policy of the Roman Catholic Church,"99 going on to say
that:
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is
more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme
of values .... It is organized on the premise that secular education
can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a
strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that
after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will
be better fitted to choose his religion. 100
This may be competent theology, but it not good law for
a liberal state. Moreover, this language is not easily
dismissed as the bitter dissent of a disaffected justice.
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the majority in
Everson, explained that the Court's decision in that case
rested on "the verge" of territory forbidden by the Establish-
ment Clause."1 It is not unreasonable to assume that he
wrote this in part to palliate the discomfort of his dissenting
colleagues, although there does not appear to have been any
love lost between Justices Black and Jackson."2 More to the
point, Justice Black seems to have promised his colleagues
at conference that he would allow no further aid.'3
The Court's decision in Everson provided the rhetorical
basis for strict separationism. In 1971, when the Court
handed down Lemon v. Kurtzman,'" its first school-funding
case of any significance,0 ° it began its analysis of the con-
98. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 122-26; see generally Laycock,
Underlying Unity, supra note 26, at 57-58.
99. 330 U.S. at 22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 23-24.
101. Id. at 16.
102. See EDWIN M. YODER, JR., THE UNMAKING OF A WHIG AND OTHER ESSAYS
IN SELF-DEFINITION 3-140 (1990) (describing the Black-Jackson feud). I am
indebted to Joel Goldstein for this reference.
103. See McGreevy, supra note 73, at 122 at n.79 (citing Wiley B. Rutledge,
Memo After Conference in WILEY B. RUTLEDGE PAPERS (Everson file, box 143,
Library of Congress (1946)).
104. 403 U.S. 602.
105. Cf Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 288-89 (referring to the
reimbursement for transportation expenses approved in Everson and the
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stitutional issue by citing Everson and quoting Justice
Black's assertion that the decision in that case carried the
Court "to 'the verge' of forbidden territory under the
Religion Clauses."'" Similarly, in Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, °7 the case from
the era of strict separationism most nearly approximating a
school choice case, the Court again noted that the program
approved in Everson "approach[ed] the 'verge' of im-
permissible state aid.""8 Thus, the traditionally separation-
ist Court hewed as best it could to the (admittedly fuzzy)
line drawn in Everson."°9 Mere adherence to an announced
rule, of course, is neither wrong nor evidence of improper
animus. But where improper animus seems to have contrib-
uted to the initial drawing of the line, it is at least fair to
argue that the line would not be where it is but for that
animus. Moreover, at least one scholar has suggested that
discomfort with religions perceived as authoritarian, such
as Roman Catholicism, may have influenced the Burger
Court."' To the extent the foregoing arguments are persua-
sive, they undermine traditional separationism's claim to be
the well-settled judgment of the polity.
B. Fear, Rational and Irrational
One plausible response to the charge of negative
animus toward Catholicism in the United States on the
part of the early separationist Court is that the justices
were not so much anti-catholic as pro-democratic. Indeed,
lending of secular textbooks approved in Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), as offering no more than "incidental support to church schools").
106. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611-12 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
107. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
108. Id. at 775 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
109. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 289.
110. Looking back on cases from the 1970s, Professor Michael E. Smith had
the following measured comments on the subject:
[Iln cases involving government aid to religion, some Justices [referring
primarily to the Burger Court] have continued to express concern about
its tendency to produce social disunity and strife. In recent years, cases
evoking these expressions of concern have mainly involved aid to
Catholic parochial schools .... It is possible that even Justices of [this]
generation who view corporate religion favorably and are not hostile to
the Catholic Church are still uneasy about religious institutions that
are thought to be unduly disciplined and expansionist.
The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 S. CT. REV. 83, 115.
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much of the twentieth century was a time of acute fear-
fear of communism, fear of fascism, and fear that
democracy was not a viable system of government."1 On
this view, some might argue that the early strict
separationists worked in a time of palpable fear that
Roman Catholic hierarchicalism and dogmatism would
undermine American democracy from within. As John
Dewey argued in 1939:
The serious threat to our democracy is not the existence of foreign
totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal
attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions similar to
those which have given a victory to external authority, discipline,
uniformity and dependence upon The Leader in foreign
countries.
But the passage of time and the occurrence of a number
of intervening events have significantly undermined
whatever rational predicate originally may have underlain
such fears."3 Certainly the election of a Roman Catholic
President in 1960 helped greatly to improve relations
between Catholics and non-Catholics in the United
States." '4 Also important has been the increasing assimila-
tion of Catholic immigrant groups into American culture, as
well as the increasing "Americanization" of Catholic
schools, both of which trends have been amply described in
the legal literature."' Perhaps most importantly, the many
reforms of the Second Vatican Council have changed
considerably the terms of the theological and philosophical
debate between Catholics and non-Catholics, particularly
Protestants."6 Indeed, in 1984 the editor of the Christian
111. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 125 (1973) (noting the spread
of dictatorship in Europe in the 1920s).
112. Id. at 112 (quoting from John Dewey's essay Freedom and Culture).
Paul Blanshard put the matter as follows: "American Catholics are instructed
to accept the privileges of American democracy and work to force the lives of all
the people, Catholic and non-Catholic, into the pattern laid down in Rome."
BLANSHARD, supra note 92, at 50.
113. See generally Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case, supra note 26, at
386-88.
114. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 70-79.
115. See Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case, supra note 26, at 386-87.
116. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 79-87. Curry notes as follows:
Protestants were not always happy with what they felt was too great
hesitancy on the part of Rome to adopt specific decrees on some of [the
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Century, Martin E. Marty, noted in retrospect that it was
"hard to think one's way back to the times before Vatican II,
before ecumenical and self-critical Catholicism, before
non-Catholic awareness of intra-Catholic conflict and the
like," to "reconstruct a plausible basis" for the fear of
Catholicism expressed in the mainstream Protestant press
in the mid-twentieth century."7
The reforms of the Second Vatican Council were
numerous and profound, and many are beyond the scope of
this paper. Of particular importance here are changes in
the outlook of the Church toward non-Catholic Christian
traditions, changes in the outlook of the Church toward
non-Christian traditions, changes in the Church's official
attitude toward non-establishment, and changes in the
Church's basic understanding of itself. These will be
addressed in terms of four of the Council's principal
declarations, Unitatis Redintegratio (Decree on Ecumen-
ism), Nostrae aetate (Declaration on the Relation of the
Church to Non-Christian Religions), Dignitatis Humanae
(Declaration on Religious Freedom), and Lumen Gentium
(Dogmatic Constitution of the Church).
1. Unitatis Redintegratio (the restoration of unity). The
Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio (the restora-
tion of unity), which was released on November 21, 1964,
addressed relations between the Catholic Church and other
Christian faiths."8 Although it stopped well short of
accepting such faiths as full-fledged partners in the Chris-
tian confession," 9 it did express a degree of esteem that
topics on the table at the Second Vatican Council], but they were quick
to admit that changes were taking place which would be momentous in
terms of interfaith attitudes for Catholics and consequently for
Protestants themselves.
Id. at 82.
117. Martin E. Marty, Peace and Pluralism: The Century 1946-1952,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 24, 1984, at 979, 981.
118. POPE PAUL VI, DECREE UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO ON ECUMENISM (1964)
[hereinafter UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO].
119. For example, the document insists upon the apostolic succession and
papal primacy:
For it is only through Christ's Catholic Church, which is the "all-
embracing means of salvation," that [our separated brethren] can
benefit fully from the means of salvation. We believe that the Our Lord
entrusted all the blessings of the New Covenant to the apostolic college
alone, of which Peter is the head, in order to establish the one Body of
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reflected profound progress from combative times past. 120 In
particular, this decree recognized a strong form of con-
tingent validity in non-Catholic Christian traditions,
121
disavowed any claim that adherents to such traditions were
guilty of the sin of schism,122 and encouraged patience and
humility on the part of Catholics engaging in ecumenical
work. In one important passage, it provided that:
There can be no ecumenism worthy of the name without a change
of heart. For it is from renewal of the inner life of our minds, from
self-denial and an unstinted love that desires of unity take their
rise and develop in a mature way. We should therefore pray to the
Holy Spirit for the grace to be genuinely self-denying, humble,
gentle in the service of others, and to have an attitude of brotherly
generosity towards them ....
The words of St. John hold good about sins against unity: "If we
say we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in
us." So we humbly beg pardon of God and of our separated
brethren, just as we forgive them that trespass against us.
Christ on earth to which all should be fully incorporated who belong in
any way to the people of God.
Id. 3.
120. See generally THOMAS BOKENKOrTER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 366 (1977). Bokenkotter writes that Unitatis Redintegratio:
put the whole matter of Protestant-Catholic relations in an entirely
new perspective. The ultimate goal of ecumenism was no longer viewed
as the return of individual Protestants to the Catholic Church; the
objective now was rather the reunion of all the separated brethren,
whose status as true ecclesial communities was recognized. Id.
121. See UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO, supra note 118, 3 (stating that "some
and even very many of the significant elements and endowments which
together go to build up and give life to the Church itself, can exist outside the
visible boundaries of the Catholic Church"). The decree added:
The brethren divided from us also use many liturgical actions of the
Christian religion. These most certainly can truly engender a life of
grace in ways that vary according to the condition of each Church or
Community. These liturgical actions must be regarded as capable of
giving access to the community of salvation.
Id.
122. See id. 3 (noting that "men of both sides were to blame" for schisms,
and that "[t]he children who are born into these [separated] Communities and
who grow up believing in Christ cannot be accused of the sin involved in the
separation, and the Catholic Church embraces upon them as brothers, with
respect and affection").
123. Id. 7.
960 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
In addition to calling for patience and humility,
Unitatis Redintegratio also called upon Catholics to seek a
sincere and improved dialogue with people of other
Christian traditions, with particular emphasis upon greater
understanding of the principles of such traditions."' In fact,
the document noted in more than one place that Catholics
can be edified by Protestant perspectives on Christian
issues.125 Thirty-one years later, the Church enthusiastically
reiterated many of the principles of Unitatis Redintegratio
in the Encyclical Letter Ut Unum Sint, on commitment to
ecumenism. 26
2. Nostrae aetate (in our time). A product of the Council
similar to Unitatis Redintegratio was Nostrae aetate (in our
time), the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to
Non-Christian Religions.'27 This document, which was re-
leased on October 28, 1965, included the following irenic
language:
The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in
these religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and
conduct, the precepts and teachings, which, although differing in
many ways from her own teaching, nonetheless often reflect a ray
of that truth which enlightens all men.
12 8
124. See id. 9.
125. See id. I 4, 11. After exhorting Catholics to "preserve unity in [the
Church's] essentials," the document goes on to recognize the contributions that
Protestants have made to the Christian tradition:
On the other hand, Catholics must gladly acknowledge and esteem the
truly Christian endowments from our common heritage which are to be
found among our separated brethren. It is right and salutary to
recognize the riches of Christ and virtuous works in the lives of others
who are bearing witness to Christ, sometimes even to the shedding of
their blood .... Nor should we forget that anything wrought by the
grace of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of our separated brethren can be
a help to our own edification. Whatever is truly Christian is never
contrary to what genuinely belongs to the faith; indeed, it can always
bring a deeper realization of the mystery of Christ and the Church.
Id. 91 4.
126. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER UT UNUM SINT ON COMMITMENT TO
ECUMENISM (1995).
127. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION NOSTRAE AETATE ON THE
RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS (1965).
128. Id. 2.
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Nostrae aetate went on to exhort the Catholic faithful to
demonstrate toward non-Christians the same kind of
deference and humility as Unitatis Redintegratio contem-
plated for relations with non-Catholic Christians:
The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue
and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out
with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and
life, they recognize, preserve and promote the good things,
spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found
among these men.129
3. Dignitatis Humanae (the dignity of the human
person). The Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis
Humanae (the dignity of the human person) on the right of
the person and of communities to social and civil freedom in
religious matters, promulgated by Pope Paul VI on Decem-
ber 7, 1965,13° represented a particularly important reform
of the Second Vatican Council from the American per-
spective, for it freed American Catholics from any doctrinal
expectation to seek preferential legal status for Roman
Catholicism in the United States. Whereas the Church had
historically called upon all nations to give it special status
among religions,' this declaration broke off in a new
direction, recognizing the value of individual self-deter-
mination and the impossibility of respecting the dignity of
human beings without according them the power to follow
the truth as revealed to them." This reform was achieved
in large measure through the offices of John Courtney
Murray, an American Jesuit who comprehended the
profound inconsistency between the Church's position on
129. Id.
130. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ON THE RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND OF COMMUNITIES TO
SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN RELIGIOUS MATTERS (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS
HUMANAE].
131. See BOKENKOTTER, supra note 120, at 363 (referring to the Syllabus of
Errors and the principle that "error has no rights"). In the 1864 encyclical
Syllabus of Modern Errors, Pope Pius IX identified as one such error the idea
that "[elvery man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by
the light of reason, he shall consider true." PIUS IX, SYLLABUS OF MODERN
ERRORS: A CONDEMNATION OF MODERNIST, LIBERAL ERRORS (1864) at 15 (citing
ALLOCUTION MAXIMA QUIDEM (1862); DAMNATIO MULTIPLICES iNTER (1851)).
132. See DIGNITATISHUMANAE, supra note 130, 2.
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establishment with political custom in such vibrantly
democratic nations as the United States.133 Without deviat-
ing from the theological principles of Roman Catholic
faith,.. Dignitatis Humanae nevertheless recognized that
true religious growth comes from within, and joined in
promoting the voluntarism central to the American relig-
ious experience, noting that "it is upon the human con-
science that [the obligations to seek and embrace the truth]
fall and exert their binding force. The truth cannot impose
itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its
entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power."135
4. Lumen Gentium (the light of nations). This brings us
to the Church's internal, theological reforms. Given the
substance of the intellectual indictment of Catholicism in
the United States in the mid-twentieth century-that it dis-
couraged individual thought and was overly authoritari-
an-perhaps the most important reform of the Second Vati-
can Council lay in its re-characterization of the Church's
own understanding of itself.'36 This was particularly evident
in the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church Lumen Gen-
tium (the light of nations), promulgated by Pope Paul VI on
November 21, 1964.1" This document represented a funda-
mental change in the nature of the Church's perception of
itself. Although the sociology of the Church-in the field, as
it were-may have continued to be relatively authoritarian,
133. See BOKENKOTTER, supra note 120, at 397-98.
134. See DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 130, 1 (explaining that "God
Himself has made known to mankind the way in which men are to serve Him").
135. Id. See also WITTE, supra note 46, at 39 (describing liberty of conscience
as "the general solvent used in the early American experiment in religious
liberty"); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 50-52 (1996) (discussing
voluntarism in several religious traditions).
The Second Vatican Council also effected a relative demotion of Thomist
philosophy, reducing it to a status somewhat commensurate to that of other
philosophic traditions. In particular, the Council demonstrated a greater
openness to the role of history in the revelation of divine truth. This
represented a compromise of sorts with the modernist tradition. See
BOKENKOTTER, supra note 120, at 366-67; cf. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE
CATHOLIC MOMENT: THE PARADOX OF THE CHURCH IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD 8
(1987) ("[Flor generations Thomism was the reigning theology and habit of
mind in Roman Catholicism. With few exceptions, to be a Roman Catholic
theologian was to be a Thomist. That is no longer the case today.").
136. See generally BOKENKOTTER, supra note 120, at 365-66.
137. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
LUMEN GENTIUM (1964).
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the Church's official teaching and understanding of itself,
as set forth in Lumen Gentium, became much less
authoritarian than it had been in times past.
The specific reforms of this document were several.
First, it recognized the universality of the Church, greatly
reducing the significance of the distinction between clergy
and laity."8 Second, it recognized, to a degree, the legiti-
macy of the so-called "Doctrine of Collegiality," pursuant to
which the collected bishopric of the Church may by right
participate in the exercise of papal authority. 9 It is difficult
to assess the long-term impact of Lumen Gentium, but it
has been perceived by many as an important step toward
egalitarianism within the structure of the Church. In fact,
the historian Thomas Bokenkotter has argued that "rt]he
practical import of [Lumen Gentium's changes] created a
veritable revolution in the machinery of the Church as a
greatly increased number of persons were drawn into the
decision-making process at every level.' 4 °
5. Reflections on the Second Vatican Council. The
impact of the Second Vatican Council on the character of
the Roman Catholic Church in the United States is difficult
to assess, but surely it was substantial.4 1 Catholics were
instructed to reach out to people of other faiths, to renounce
an intention to establish their faith before others in the
political arena, and to "think more for themselves." Al-
though one cannot reasonably assume that all Catholics
living in the United States were in the 1960s, or are today,
prepared to heed the call of such documents as Unitatis
138. See id. 10. This document indicates that "Christ the Lord, High Priest
taken from among men, made the new people 'a kingdom and priests to God the
Father.' The baptized, by regeneration and the anointing of the Holy Spirit, are
consecrated as a spiritual house and a holy priesthood .... . Id. (footnotes
omitted). See also id. 10:
Though they differ from one another in essence and not only in degree,
the common priesthood of the faithful and the ministerial or hierarchi-
cal priesthood are nonetheless interrelated: each of them in its own
special way is a participation in the one priesthood of Christ.
139. See id. IT 21-22. See also BOKENKOTTER, supra note 120, at 361-62.
140. BOKENKOrrER, supra note 120, at 366.
141. See NEUHAUS, supra note 135, at 4 ("Anti-Roman polemicists ... say
that Rome has not changed; Roman Catholic traditionalists say it should not
have changed. But it has changed and dramatically so."). See also id. at 10
(suggesting that "'the spirit of Vatican II' was the lively ghost of the renegade
monk from Wittenberg"-meaning Martin Luther).
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Redintegratio, Nostrae aetate, Dignitatis Humanae, and
Lumen Gentium, the exhortations contained in these
documents do tend to palliate apprehension that American
Catholics will wage an aggressive, papally ordained war
with non-Catholics over theological principles. Indeed, in
this regard the hierarchical nature of the Roman Catholic
Church may have a salutary effect. Because the Church
remains more hierarchical than most, it can, colloquially
speaking, "turn on a dime," calling upon its clergy in the
field, as well as its most faithful, to accommodate new
principles in a relatively short space of time.14 1 In any case,
to the extent the reforms of Vatican II have taken hold, fear
of Roman Catholicism in the United States loses much of its
predicate.
Against this backdrop, the recent declaration Dominus
Iesus (The Lord Jesus), on the unicity and salvific uni-
versality of Jesus Christ and the Church," 3 promulgated on
August 6, 2000, must be considered. This document has
been perceived by some as a throwback to pre-Vatican II
principles, in the sense that it reads somewhat like a new
Syllabus of Errors.4 In this regard, the document does
identify and, colloquially speaking, anathematize certain
beliefs. And in fact the document does reject certain
"relativistic theories" that "seek to justify religious
pluralism, not only de facto but also de Jure. As part of
this rejection, Dominus Iesus reiterates a substantial
amount of theological doctrine, calling upon Catholics to
assent to certain fundamental principles. Perhaps most
significantly, the document emphasizes the unique role of
142. I am indebted to Tom Berg for this insight. Unitatis Redintegratio
provides a rhetorical example of this principle in action. Certain parts of this
document were expressly directed to clergy and other leaders in the Church:
Sacred theology and other branches of knowledge, especially of a
historical nature, must be taught with due regard for the ecumenical
point of view, so that they may correspond more exactly with the facts.
It is most important that future shepherds and priests should have
mastered a theology that has been carefully worked out in this way and
not polemically, especially with regard to those aspects which concern
the relations of separated brethren with the Catholic Church.
UNITATISREDINTEGRATIO, supra note 118, 10.
143. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION DOMINUS
IESUS ON THE UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE
CHURCH, 92 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 742 (2000) [hereinafter DOMINUS IESUS].
144. See Pius IX, supra note 131.
145. DOMINUS IESUS, supra note 143, 3, 4.
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the Catholic Church in the salvation of humankind.
"Therefore, in connection with the unicity and universality
of the salvific mediation of Jesus Christ, the unicity of the
Church founded by him must be firmly believed as a truth
of Catholic faith."1
Although this does not preclude salvation for non-
Catholics, it rests upon a belief that salvation of such
persons lies through the good offices of the Catholic
Church. 47 In addition, Dominus Iesus reiterates the cen-
trality of the apostolic succession to Church doctrine,
calling upon Catholics to affirm that principle.148 Along the
way, the document refers to non-Catholic Christian tradi-
tions as "deriv[ing] their efficacy from the very fullness of
grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church.""1 9
Needless to say, mature religious traditions do not
enjoy being referred to as "derivative," and Dominus Iesus
provoked a significant negative reaction.5 ° As the leaders of
the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), a Protestant
denomination, wrote in measured response to Dominus
Iesus:
It seems inconsistent to us for the Roman Catholic Church to
proclaim that ecumenism is central to the church's life and
witness, and then to issue a statement that does not reflect that
basic commitment. The response to the Declaration recently
released by the World Council of Churches speaks for the
Disciples: "What a tragedy if this witness to a hurting (and
unbelieving) world were obscured by the Churches' dialogue about
146. Id. 16.
147. See id. 12.
[Tihe salvific action of Jesus Christ, with and through his Spirit,
extends beyond the visible boundaries of the Church to all humanity.
Speaking of the paschal mystery, in which Christ even now associates
the believer to himself in a living manner in the Spirit and gives him
the hope of resurrection, the [Second Vatican] Council states: "All this
holds true not only for Christians but also for all men of good will in
whose hearts grace is active invisibly."
Id. (quoting SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH
IN THE MODERN WORLD GAUDIUMETSPES 22 (1965)).
148. See DOMINUSIESUS, supra note 143, J 16.
149. Id.
150. See Peter Steinfels, A Vatican Office Attacks Pluralistic Relativism,
and the Resulting Fallout is Spread Far and Wide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at
B8.
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their relative authority and status-however important they may
be. 151
But Dominus Iesus must be read in perspective. Not
many faiths claim to be non-exclusive.152 In essence,
Dominus Iesus simply provides that claiming to be Roman
Catholic means some things and does not mean others.
Thus, it calls upon the Roman Catholic faithful to
distinguish between Roman Catholic precepts and those of
other faiths:
[Tihe distinction between theological faith and belief in the other
religions... must be firmly held. If faith is the acceptance of
revealed truth, which makes it possible to penetrate the mystery
in a way that allows us to understand it coherently, then belief, in
the other religions, is that sum of experience and thought that
constitutes the human treasury of wisdom and religious
aspiration, which man in his search for truth has conceived and
acted upon in his relationship to God and the Absolute.'
53
It is hard to imagine that language like this, even if it is
coupled with an unfortunate description of other traditions
as "derivative," would provoke a new age of religious
intolerance on the part of Roman Catholics in the United
States. Although Dominus Iesus does persevere in
identifying Catholic doctrine as more completely valid than
the doctrine of other traditions, it also reiterates a desire
for continued communication among people of different
faiths:
"Inter-religious dialogue, which is part of the Church's
evangelizing mission, requires an attitude of understanding
and a relationship of mutual knowledge and reciprocal
enrichment, in obedience to the truth and with respect for
freedom." 54
151. Letter from Robert K. Welsh & Paul A. Crow Jr., Reverends, to Edward
Iris Cardinal Cassidy, President, Vatican City, Pontifical Council for Promoting
Christian Unity (Oct. 20, 2000), http://www.disciples.org/ccu/documents/
Dominus.htm. I am indebted to Michael Mooty for sending me this letter.
152. In fact, the most successful faiths-in terms of the religious economy-
do not make this claim. See STARK & FINKE, supra note 10, at 142 ("Among
religious organizations, there is a reciprocal relationship between the degree of
lay commitment and the degree of exclusivity.").
153. Id. 7 (emphasis removed, quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
154. DOMINUS IESUS, supra note 143, T 2 (footnotes omitted).
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In light of the foregoing reasoning, it is difficult to
sustain the argument that extending a choice program to
include students at Roman Catholic elementary and
secondary schools would endanger our traditions of
intellectual liberty and democratic self-governance.
It is also important to bear in mind the distinction
between Roman Catholic doctrine and the practice of Ro-
man Catholics in the United States. The Church is
understandably famous for some of the positions it has
taken on controversial social issues, such as abortion, con-
traception, and divorce, to name a few. But these positions
are not in themselves relevant to the question whether the
Church, through the exercise of its authority, threatens
American democracy. There is nothing inherently wrong
about the leadership of a church bearing witness to the
faith they espouse, nor is there anything wrong with
members of that church being persuaded by leadership. The
relevant questions, therefore, are whether Catholics in the
United States are doctrinally bound to implement the
positions of the Church's leadership, and as a sociological
matter whether they will in fact do so. The democratization
of the Church recognized in the Second Vatican Council
indicates that the Catholic laity in the United States will be
encouraged to participate in the political process as
individuals.155 And to the reforms of Vatican II must be add-
ed the continuing "Americanization" of Catholics living in
the United States,'56 as well as the very real tradition of
dissent within the Catholic Church.'57 In sum, judicial fear
of the growth of Roman Catholicism in the United States
cannot easily be based upon dogma, the dogma having
grown in its subtlety over the past forty years. On the other
hand, judicial fear based on the sociology of American
155. See generally NEUHAUS, supra note 135, at 270-73 (discussing the role
that the "sense of the faithful" (sensus fidelium) plays in the development of
Catholic theology); id. at 270 ("As Eastern Orthodox theologians are fond of
pointing out, the faithful sometimes rejected heresies before the theologians
recognized them as such. The fourth-century crusade against Arianism, which
denied the full divinity of Christ, was largely led by laypeople.").
156. To this may be added the increasing "Mexicanization" of American
Catholicism, for example, which suggests that calls for orthodoxy will lose some
of their potency. See Gregory Rodriguez, A Church, Changing, WALL ST. J.,
March 8, 2002, at W13 (discussing how a "Mexican religious observance...
concentrates more on cultural practice than orthodoxy").
157. See generally ROBERT MCCLORY, FAITHFUL DISSENTERS: STORIES OF MEN
AND WOMEN WHO LOVED AND CHANGED THE CHURCH (2000).
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Catholicism is either misplaced, given the variegation
within that population, or difficult to justify.
C. Formal Neutrality
The final element in the case against treating
traditional separationism as the well-settled judgment of
the polity lies in realistic assessment of traditional
separationism's continuing role in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Because this form of separationism has been
substantially eclipsed in some of its most important
applications by a focus upon the equal treatment of all
claimants to public largesse, without regard to religious or
non-religious orientation, it can no longer claim the kind of
adherence that stare decisis would otherwise demand.
Strict separationism dominated the Supreme Court's
approach to the Establishment Clause from 1947 until
sometime in the early to mid-1980s. During that period of
thirty to forty years, the Court struck down a wide variety
of programs and policies designed to promote religion or
deemed to have such promotion as their primary effect.
This separationism reached its height of influence in the
1970s, when the Court struck down a number of programs
that provided financial aid to private, sectarian schools.
The 1980s, however, saw a new trend in the Court's
implementation of the Establishment Clause. Figuratively
speaking, the Court backed into this trend, because it
introduced this new theme to Establishment Clause juris-
prudence as a byproduct of adjudicating challenges under
the Speech, Press, and Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
One watershed case was Widmar v. Vincent, decided in
1981.15" In this case, the Court held that the University of
Missouri at Kansas City could not bar a Christian evangeli-
cal student group from using facilities that were generally
open for use by student groups. The facts of the case were
as follows: From 1973 until 1977, the group regularly used
the University's facilities for meetings that included prayer,
158. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). I am indebted to David Wagner for emphasizing
the significance of this decision, although the perception of Widmar as a
watershed case is not universally held. See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra
note 26, at 63.
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hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of various
religious issues. In 1977, the University informed the
students that they could no longer use its facilities for their
meetings, on the ground that such use constituted an
establishment of religion. The students brought suit against
the University's officials, arguing that the decision to
exclude them from public facilities constituted discrimina-
tion on the basis of the content of their speech. The stu-
dents argued that religious speech is entitled to the same
degree of protection from the Constitution as any other
form of speech. The University argued that excluding the
group from public facilities served the compelling interest of
preventing an establish-ment of religion.
In a decision that flowed seamlessly from free speech
law, but represented something of a break from Establish-
ment Clause law, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
students, and ordered UMKC to let the group use its
facilities. The Court based its opinion on the nature of
meeting space at a public university, and reasoned that no
one familiar with the wide variety of student groups on a
campus like that of UMKC would perceive the students' use
of the University's facilities as a union of church and state.
So many decisions have followed in Widmar's wake that
numerous scholars of the Establishment Clause have opin-
ed that the era of strict separationism is coming to an
end."' Indeed, these decisions have been far-reaching. In
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, ° for example, the Court ordered the University to
release money from a student activities fund to pay the
expenses of Wide Awake, an explicitly evangelical student
newspaper.'61 This was a particularly controversial decision
because it required the University, a public entity, to
expend money on behalf of an explicitly religious organiza-
159. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, What's Next After Separationism?, 46 EMORY
L.J. 75 (1997); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
160. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
161. See id. at 845-46.
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tion."' Dissenting Justice Souter decried this requirement
as a violation of a cardinal principle of separationism."'
Other decisions following in Widmar's train have
included Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens, " in which a divided Court upheld the
Equal Access Act, which requires public secondary schools
that receive federal funding and that maintain a "limited
open forum" to allow any student group to use that forum,
without regard to the content of its speech; Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,165 in which
the Court required a school district to allow a private group
to show religiously oriented films in a generally available
school facility during off-hours, even though the facility was
not itself a public forum; Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette,"' in which a divided Court
required a permitting agency to allow the Ku Klux Klan to
place an unattended cross in a public park across the street
from the Ohio State Capitol; and Good News Club v.
Milford Central School,"' in which the Court required a
school board to allow a Christian students' club to meet at a
public school after school hours.
In each of these instances, as in Widmar itself, certain
factors could be adduced to support the argument that the
overall effect of allowing the religious group to use the
public facility or resource in question was less to promote
religion than to promote equality, or that no reasonable
person would perceive such use of public facilities as
governmental promotion of religion. In Rosenberger, for
example, the majority was able to capitalize on the fact that
money from the student activities fund went directly to
Wide Awake's third-party vendors, and not to the news-
paper itself.168 Additional devices were found in that case,
and similar devices were found in each of the other cases
that followed in Widmar's train. But the trend is un-
162. See id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Laycock, Underlying
Unity, supra note 26, at 65 (describing Rosenberger as "a case that fell near the
core of both [no-aid and non-discrimination] theories [of the Establishment
Clause]").
163. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 873-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
165. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
166. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
167. 121 S.Ct. 2093 (2001).
168. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842-44.
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mistakable, and undermines the doctrinal significance of
these devices.169 The constant through all these cases is that
the religious group prevailed. The rule is therefore emerg-
ing, at least where claims are predicated on the Speech,
Press, Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses, that any
governmental resource made broadly available to the public
must be made available to religiously oriented groups on a
non-discriminatory basis. It is difficult to argue that this
"equal treatment" approach has not vigorously captured the
attention of the Court.
Indeed, this approach has also captured the attention of
the Court in claims not predicated on other provisions of
the Constitution. Since 1985, the Court has upheld the
inclusion of religiously oriented entities in public programs
in at least three different cases, with no examples to the
contrary.17' For example, in 1997 the Court overruled one of
its earlier decisions and held that public employees could
provide remedial education to disadvantaged children on
the premises of private, sectarian schools as part of Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.171
In 2000, the Court went on to uphold certain other aspects
of that statute, as amended, and doing so entailed
overruling two decisions from the 1970s that had prohibited
various practices. 7 ' Finally, in the recent Zelman case, the
Court upheld a formally neutral educational choice plan.'73
These decisions stand in sharp contrast to the period before
1985, in which the Court rarely upheld programs that
provided aid to private, sectarian institutions.
169. See generally Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 26, at 66-67
(explaining that "the majority [in Rosenberger] hedged the opinion with un-
persuasive distinctions and reservations").
170. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002) (holding that
Ohio's school choice program does not offend the Establishment Clause);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality) (holding that the provision of
educational equipment by a public agency to private, sectarian schools is not an
endorsement of religion); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that
remedial educational services by public employees on private, sectarian
premises was consistent with the Establishment Clause).
171. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235, overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985). The Agostini Court also overruled part of Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
172. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. at 692-93, overruling Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
173. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473.
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It should not come as a surprise that such an approach
has captured the attention of legally trained minds. Formal
neutrality reflects an approach to rulemaking that is in-
herently appealing-that of treating all similarly situated
phenomena alike. Indeed, the strategy of challenging
rules and practices as discriminatory, rather than challeng-
ing them as deficient in some substantive sense, has proven
to be effective for other groups perceiving themselves as
being in the political minority. " Moreover, formal neutral-
ity neatly avoids one of the most significant faults of
substantive neutrality, namely, the difficulty of ever know-
ing precisely where the line is, or precisely why the courts
draw lines as they do.
176
As noted much earlier in this paper, the decision in
Zelman was close, but the wide-angle picture should not be
missed. The trend over last two decades has been decidedly
in the direction of formal neutrality, even if it has never
quite gotten there-and even if it never should quite get
there. Consequently, it would be difficult to argue, at this
174. As Eugene Volokh has written, "Equality rings truer to our notions of
the government's proper role with regard to religion than does discrimination."
Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 341, 345 (1999); id. at 346 ("Equal treatment... fits with
most people's intuitive responses [to hypotheticals regarding public programs
and the Establishment Clause]."). See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) ("A
principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues
in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved.").
175. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a
Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy against a substantive due
process challenge, with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down on
equal protection grounds an amendment to a state constitution that prohibited
laws designed to protect homosexual people from discrimination). See generally
Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373
(1997) (discussing the difference between challenging a statute under the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause).
176. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2470 ("The constitutionality of a neutral
educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a
particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious
organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.");
Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1995)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Petitioners' rule [allowing a court to find an
'endorsement of religion' in the absence of actual endorsement by the
government] would require school districts adopting similar policies in the
future to guess whether some undetermined critical mass of the community
might nonetheless perceive the district to be advocating a religious viewpoint.").
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point, that unreconstituted strict separationism continues
to function as a vital source of new jurisprudence on the
Court. This, in itself, is a signal of its weakness.
177
III. CHOICE PROGRAMS
The traditional approach to separation of church and
state is certainly entitled to respect in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, not only because of its
longevity, but also because of its consistency with many
people's understanding of the prerequisites for religious
freedom. 178 Although traditional separationism asserted a
basis in original intent well beyond what the historical
record can sustain, and although it appears to have found
roots in religious tensions and perhaps even uncharitable
opinions prevalent in the mid-twentieth century, it was
nevertheless substantially infused with good faith from the
beginning. But this is not enough to sustain a constitutional
tradition on a permanent basis. 79 A tradition with the kind
of mixed record described in the foregoing sections of this
paper, and a somewhat exhausted tradition at that, merits
re-evaluation, particularly where the opportunity cost of
continued adherence is high.
As I argued earlier in this paper, choice plans can
facilitate myriad approaches to learning and thinking, as
well as new approaches to building bridges between people
177. Cf Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
855 (1992) (noting that the applicability of stare decisis depends in part on
whether growth in the law since an earlier decision has left that decision a
"doctrinal anachronism discounted by society").
178. As the Court noted in Casey:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to
accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices
that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends
on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which
their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the
Nation.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66.
179. See generally Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case, supra note 26, at
386 (footnote omitted) ("The Protestant paranoia fueled by waves of Catholic
immigration to the U.S., beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, cannot form
the basis of a stable constitutional principle, and the stability of the principle
has been undermined by the amelioration of those concerns...").
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of different religious traditions. 8 ° Some people sincerely
believe that learning, group therapy and self-help are most
effective and enduring if they take place in an atmosphere
suffused with normative considerations and even reference
to revealed truth. Others very reasonably and sincerely
disagree. The First Amendment need not take sides in this
debate, at least where the government's role in the educa-
tional and charitable system is no less attenuated than it is
in the health care context.' Choice plans exploit the
government's ability to raise and distribute revenue- and
nothing more-in favor of a pluralistic approach to
education and the administration of charity. Choice
programs enable people to secure important social services
in contexts congenial to their world views. 8'
Such plans also enable religious traditions to develop
and articulate their beliefs in ways that are likely to foment
increased engagement between traditions at a theological
level. The historian Lerond Curry described in detail the
many forms of ecumenical dialogue between Catholics and
Protestants in the United States in the years before and
after Vatican II, noting in particular the depth and
endurance of many of the connections that were forged in
this process."' Although concern for both religion and the
180. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
181. See Lupu, Increasingly Anachronistic Case, supra note 26, at 375
(defending a situation in which the federal government paid for medical care
provided by a sectarian institution by stating that "[n]o Religion Clause scholar
or advocate of whom I am aware would argue that government payment to St.
Peter's Hospital for the cost of medical service for my father's benefit violated
the Establishment Clause").
182. A plausible objection at this point could be that some religious schools
would teach hatred, or that some religiously affiliated charities would divert
some of the public funding they receive toward illegal purposes. The first
response to these objections is that a judicial determination that choice
programs do not violate the Establishment Clause is not equivalent to a legis-
lative determination to adopt such a program. Moreover, there are non-
discriminatory means by which the government can monitor the use of its funds
to prevent undesirable outcomes. For example, the government can institute
strict accounting controls, requiring religiously affiliated schools and charities
to demonstrate that public funds are put to their intended uses. Also, a
requirement that participating schools and charities not discriminate on the
basis of race or religion should deter the teaching of hatred. Finally, we should
not lightly presume illegal behavior on the part of religiously affiliated
organizations.
183. See CURRY, supra note 9, at 61-70, 75-76, 79-87. Regarding ecumenist
efforts during the Kennedy years, Curry wrote:
Once again, though, it was not American politics which would bring the
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state dictates that theological study as such should not take
place in public schools, religiously oriented schools attended
by children on a voluntary basis can provide this valuable
service without detriment to either religion or the state.'84
All that is required to facilitate choice plans is a more
deferential approach to separationism than the Court has
traditionally pursued. In many ways, the Court has already
begun to venture in this direction. The Court's increasing
focus upon the importance of private choice is one aspect of
this deference. Another aspect is the Court's willingness to
presume that public employees providing secular services
on sectarian premises will remain mindful of the Establish-
ment Clause.85 A third is the Court's willingness to explore
the possibility of aggregating all meaningful choices when
deciding whether a choice plan provides a sufficiently broad
array of options to satisfy the rigors of the Establishment
Clause, as it did in Zelman." On this view, even if one
hundred percent of private institutions participating in a
choice plan are sectarian in nature, the Establishment
most vital changes in the patterns of Protestant-Catholic relations.
Rather, it was, as had been the case since the mid-1950s, in the
ecclesiastical context that the biggest advances were made. And
involving, as it did, a non-American source the growth in improved
relationships showed once more that leadership in changing interfaith
patterns lay ultimately within religious communities themselves, not
in national political events or national civic-sponsored programs.
Id. at 79.
184. Choice plans offer a variety of additional benefits that are beyond the
scope of this article. For example, they provide alternatives to public programs,
allowing for greater experimentation and facilitating reform of public
institutions due to increased competition from the private sector. See OSBORNE
& PLASTRIK, BANISHING BUREAUCRACY, supra note 19, at 11 ("Asset sales,
contracting out, and other tools that fall under the heading of privatization are
part of the reinventor's tool kit. But... it is competition and customer choice
that force improvement, not simply private ownership."). See also Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (reasoning that private schools provide a
"benchmark" for public schools).
In addition, educational choice programs will dramatically relieve pressure
on the public schools to include religious text and iconography into their
curriculum. Although it is impractical to believe that the Court will reverse its
position and allow public schools to include such text and iconography in their
curriculum (except in limited ways), see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 283,
many constituencies still clamor for such inclusion. They will have significantly
less cause to complain if private, sectarian schools exist as a financially viable
option for them.
185. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226-27.
186. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
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Clause is still satisfied if meaningful secular options are
available in the public sector. Although the Establishment
Clause would not permit the government to set up a choice
program that permitted only religiously affiliated non-
public options, there is still no cogent reason to exclude
public sector options in assessing the degree of choice
available in a formally neutral choice program. 87 But there
is at least one point that should be explored further. The
Court has not yet fully explored the extent to which so-
phisticated accounting methods could be used to ensure
that $100 of public money buys $100 of education, group
therapy, or soup. Were this option explored, it could support
the conclusion that the state is only implicated in that for
which it pays, no matter how mixed religion, education and
charity might otherwise be. Although certain firewalls
would undoubtedly be appropriate-such as a firewall
preventing the public financing of an institution that has no
non-ritual function- the mere need for such firewalls need
not justify precluding religiously oriented institutions from
competing with secular institutions in the provision of
services capable of being defined as secular in the general
market.
187. Cf Volokh, supra note 174, at 348 ("Right now, all standard K-12
spending goes to secular education; this itself is a powerful 'disparate impact'
favoring secular uses and disfavoring religious uses. School choice will diminish
this disparate impact.").
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APPENDIX
Mr. Sylvester had some doubts of the propriety of the
mode of expression used in this paragraph. He apprehended
that it was liable to a construction different from what had
been made by the committee. He feared it might be thought
to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.
Mr. Vining suggested the propriety of transposing the
two members of the sentence.
Mr. Gerry said it would read better if it was, that no
religious doctrine shall be established by law.
Mr. Sherman thought the amendment altogether un-
necessary, inasmuch as Congress had no authority what-
ever delegated to them by the constitution to make religious
establishments; he would, therefore, move to have it struck
out.
Mr. Carroll-As the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest
touch of governmental hand; and as many sects have
concurred in the opinion that they are not well secured
under the present constitution, he said he was much in
favor of adopting the words. He thought it would tend more
towards conciliating the minds of the people to the
government than almost any other amendment he had
heard proposed. He would not contend with gentlemen
about the phraseology, his object was to secure the
substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the
honest part of the community.
Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the
words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion,
and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience. Whether the words are necessary or not, he did
not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the
State Conventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that
under the clause of the constitution, which gave power to
Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry
into execution the constitution, and the laws made under it,
enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might
infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national
religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the
amendment was intended, and he thought it as well
expressed as the nature of the language would admit.
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Mr. Huntington said that he feared, With the gentleman
first up on the subject, that the words might be taken in
such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of
religion. He understood the amendment to mean what had
been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others
might find it convenient to put another construction upon
it. The ministers of their congregations to the Eastward
were maintained by the contributions [mandatory tithes] of
those who belonged to their society; the expense of building
meetinghouses was contributed in the same manner. These
things were regulated by by-laws. If an action was brought
before a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person
who had neglected to perform his engagements could not be
compelled to do it; for a support of ministers, or building of
places of worship might be construed into a religious
establishment.
By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be
established by law; he could give a history of the effects of
such a regulation; indeed the people were now enjoying the
blessed fruits of it. He hoped, therefore, the amendment
would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of
conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but
not to patronize those who professed no religion at all.
Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted
before religion, it would satisfy the minds of honorable
gentlemen. He believed that the people feared one sect
might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to
conform. He thought if the word national was introduced, it
would point the amendment directly to the object it was
intended to prevent.
Mr. Livermore was not satisfied with that amendment;
but he did not wish them to dwell long on the subject. He
thought that it would be better if it was altered, and made
to read in this manner, that Congress shall make no laws
touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.
Mr. Gerry did not like the term national, proposed by
the gentleman from Virginia, and he hoped it would not be
adopted by the House. It brought to his mind some ob-
servations that had taken place in the conventions at the
time they were considering the present constitution. It had
been insisted upon by those who were called antifederalists,
that this form of Government consolidated the Union; the
honorable gentleman's motion shows that he considers it in
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the same light. Those who were called antifederalists at
that time complained that they had injustice done them by
the title, because they were in favor of a Federal
Government, and the others were in favor of a national one;
the federalists were for ratifying the constitution as it
stood, and the others not until amendments were made.
Their names then ought not to have been distinguished by
federalists and antifederalists, but rat [ifieris and
antirat[ifier]s.
Mr. Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that
the words "no national religion shall be established by law,"
did not imply that the Government was a national one; the
question was then taken on Mr. Livermore's motion, and
passed in the affirmative, thirty-one for, and twenty against
it.
188
188. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in LEVY,
supra note 31, at 96-99.
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